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Theodor H. Nelson

Occasional papers on rationality and social phenomenology #1.

"How people act sometimes."

Introductory:

The purpose of writing these is to clarify in my mind and on paper some thoughts on questions which I cannot now wholly jog together or pry apart.

While calling this series "Occasional papers on r. & s.p." seems just another touch of pomp, I think there is enough of a focus on these things, and enough of a tie-in between this paper and the next ones, to give this title sense.

Should you want to see further notes in this vein, a card will be sufficient. I hardly need emphasize that a good comment is of more help than volumes of the almost-relevant.

My thanks to Charles Harris, Franklin Philip, Gilmore Stott, Michael Scriven.

I sincerely hope any further papers will be shorter than this one. There is a point where exposition becomes imposition.

This paper ranges widely, partly because I wanted quickly to erect a big framework, partly because of old problems and stews about which I wanted to write something down. I think it can be read in bits according to the reader's interests and time; sociologists may not be interested in "free will" (section 2.)

Theodor H. Nelson
c/o Department of Sociology
University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Ill.

January, 1960

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My reason for so doing is severalfold. First, I have had specific objections to certain accounts I have read. Second, I want to try systematizing what I think is a true common-sense view. Third, I will try a little bridge-building: between the behaviorist approach and the less familiar domain of phenomenology.

0.1 These things have been interesting topics for social psychologists: Losing one's temper. Insult. Revenge. Belligerence. Free will and its family-- intention, responsibility. And, of course, "social perception."

One view which I will criticize is roughly this: that such things as losing one's temper, dropping (or returning) an insult, taking revenge, necessarily represent an outpouring of emotion or affect, and have no rational basis.

While I am fully aware that emotion and affect exist, and figure significantly in human affairs, I will pretend in this paper that they do not. (The reader may add them at will for a completer theory.) I will be happy on this side if I show, among other things, that the things I've listed can sometimes be rational actions.

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tating desired consequences," or technically, "correctly considered and gratifying;" but I do not by any means claim to exhaust the word's meaning, nor to suggest that there is no greater rational good than individual strivings.

0.2 Anyone can offer up as "common sense" what he will. However, "Common sense" is also the name for a process of bringing ourselves up short when too far out on a theoretical limb: "Look here, do you <u>really</u> mean to say that...?" In Philosophy, we are reminded of G.E. Moore's refutation of MacTaggart, who said time does not exist.

Applied to one of my examples, this approach appears as, "How can you say losing your temper is purely emotional-- it sometimes gets you someplace, doesn't it?"

Another sense of "common sense" is plain talk. We are made up of atoms; but we are also people, and atom-talk when we talk about people is mostly irrelevant. So, I will assert, is S-R talk when it doesn't get at what is really happening in a situation.

Lastly, "common sense" is "what everybody knows and nobody bothers to say." I will be most plesed if I am told, "This is not theory at all. It's just what people <u>do</u>." Persuaded of this, the only use you may put this paper to is to organize criticisms of others-- who, trying to account for too much (say) with their theories of emotion, leave out the obvious.

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However, if the statement, "John is happy," is ever _true_, such a view is puzzling. While I won't elaborate this example here, I hope to show that we sometimes need something so _like_ phenomenological description that the difference is inconsequential. A good deal of this theory is "underground," dealing with unobservables and semi-observables. That is too bad.

The approach I am taking is, I guess, neo-introspectionist: or better, I don't think I have any approach at all, since I mention behaviorism here and there (with well-disguised sympathy,) and my outlook reeks with Gestalt too. Actually I would couple the hoses of all of them for more juice.

I am duty-bound to mention that phenomenology and introspection are _empirical_, in the good old historical sense of the word. The analysis of words, on which contemporary philosophy has gotten so far, is introspectional and empirical, in this sense. At several points in this paper I am not sure whether I recount or analyze. In any case, my suggestion to the reader is that he ask _first_, is it true, and _second_, how I learned it.

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I will sit heavy on these words; not because they become mellifluous in the repeating, but because paraphrase would hurt my coherence.

1.1 Consideration, I shall describe behaviorally as the weighing of something before performing an act.

Here at the outset, to be frank, the camel gets his nose under the tent. "Consideration" is that variable from which I plan to derive the necessaries of conscious experience. Now, "consideration" has both an experiential and a behavioral component; the things we consider show up in what we do, as well as passing through our heads. While I am not defining the word, I am introducing it only from the behavioral point of view.

There are enough core cases that I need not give details on how people may be shown to consider things. Trick questions, where people are fooled into giving the wrong answer by having them consider A (but forget to consider B) are a case in point-- "If a plane crashes on the Mexican border, on which side will they bury the survivors?" I expect no S-R quibbles on this. I understand that even Skinner's teaching-machines have their wrong answers sorted for different kinds of mistakes, showing what the student considered (or failed to consider,)so that he may the more quickly be improved.

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word, "perception," which I will not use. The word "perception" usually refers to one's immediate notion of what one sees (etc.,) and hence is inadequate for complex notions of things and people that we build up from many cues and inferences over time.

We have impressions of all kinds of things. Impressions are simple or complex, vague or structured, fleeting, tentative and easily revised, or strong, firmly held and hard to disconfirm.

People vary in their ability to state their impressions clearly and correctly. Moreover, when trying to communicate their impressions, they often emphasize things which are not a strong part of their impressions, or they fail to emphasize things that are. Because impressions-- particularly, I suppose, of exotic or unfamiliar things-- are fraught with so many diverse associations, often they cannot be described in a reasonable length of time except sketchily and summarily. To do so with pith, incision or universality is part of art. (This is an aside.)

When an impression is clear, organized, and perhaps stated outright, it is a theory. When a theory is considered in planning action it is an opinion or belief. (The limiting case: when a belief is true and held for good reasons, we call it knowledge.) When a belief is about the future, it is a prediction or expectation. I believe that predictions, in the usual sense (and I am trying to elucidate the usual sense,) are more specific; the expectation is more general, less easily disconfirmable. It may be noted that many predictions also

involve intermediate predicates-- theories.

"Impression" is logically a consequence, I think, of the notion of "consideration." It is grammatically necessary that you consider something; you cannot just consider; moreover, it has already been suggested that there are possible repertories of such things, and your action will be different depending on the kinds and number of things you consider.

While theories and predictions are subject to relatively simple criteria of truth or falsity, other impressions may not be. However, this is not to say a statement like "Henry is a fool" cannot be true-- but it may not be true in a simple way.

Many statements, liked "This object is red" or "Macintosh is not a murderer," are true or false in a simple way-- it is possible to state rather clearly the circumstances under which they are true or false: necessary and sufficient conditions for either.

However, many other statements, like "Sarah is in love," "The dean is mean," are true or false in a more complex way-- they do not have perfect predictive value, but they do suggest a good deal that if totally lacking would make the statement false. "The dean is mean" would almost certainly be false if he never expels anyone, does not speak roughly or throw scares into people, if he always uses measured language and is kind to his family. If he does ~~all of these~~ the first two a lot, he undoubtedly is mean. If he does ~~some of them~~ scare and expel some of the time, he may be mean and he may not, but the case is weaker; and there can be little

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reason for us to seek exact criteria for the use of the word, especially if all the facts it would summarize are before us anyhow.

It is this summary quality of the middle cases that prohibits us from saying easily that an impression is true; Sarah may be in love, but be prevented from-- or afraid to-- do anything about it. Hence the statement's predictive value is only of the tendency-type.

Of course, we might talk about such impressions as being disjunctively satisfied, i.e., a large number of different possible situations will make them true. But in the large number of cases we can think of them as being neither true nor false$_x$ (nor, N.B., metaphysical.)

Are impressions statements? Actually not. They can be phrased as statements or nouns: this pedal is connected to the gas flow" is little different from "this pedal as connected with the gas flow." (This point might be of interest to those anthropologists who insist "science" is a verb.)

1.3 Intention is a predicate of an act. We say an act is intentional if some of its consequences, attributes, etc., have been considered. Obviously an act can be more or less intentional; people frequently say, "Oh, dear, I didn't mean to do that," meaning there were features of the situation that they might have considered but did not.

I think it is clear that this sense of intentionality can be made acceptable behavioristically, merely as an extension of the notion of "consideration." But I do not mean to

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It ~~mm~~ will occur to the reader that it may not always be clear what a person intends~~mm~~ to do: for we may not know just what impressions he is considering, or how his attention is distributed, or what strategy he is likely to select.

We note with ease that some considerations take place on the purely impressionistic plane-- i.e., you sort of think about one thing, and think about another, and ponder vacuously, and choose, or whatever. This-- if you will pardon the word "think"-- is the fogbound S-R decision to which things in social psychology are too often compared-- ile., the choices made dumbly through attitude.* But it will be recalled that other decisions bring to bear much more complex considerations; the theories and predictions of engineering, for instance, which the S-R people are capable of dealing with.

1.4 Intentional impressions are impressions that a person gives of himself deliberately, considering principles (see below) he may want to follow, possible consequences, and impressions he may have of the people he is interacting with. Some people are more aware of the impressions they give than others. Some spectators' impressions are easier to predict than others'. Some people can control the impressions they give more dexterously. And so forth. Some impressions are easier to give intentionally than others: a good scream in

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Intentional impressions range from the most explicit (statements, promises, threats, contracts) to the least explicit (premeditated cunning subtle looks and gestures.) We may regard neither as systematically prior. An explicit promise, for example, is not considered by its hearer on the basis of the words alone; but on all the other cognitive knowledge and tiny cues which come to his attention.

1.5 Explicit intentional impressions-- that is, statements, promises, threats-- have an interesting special case, that in which they are scheduled.

"Scheduling" only means that they claim that they will be fulfilled in a certain regular way-- e.g., "I'll type your paper if you'll take me out next week." Occasionally such a schedule may be taken for granted-- "Darling, I will follow you to the ends of the earth."

1.6 Principles are general considerations which an individual considers intentionally-- i.e., considers them as things that should be considered;* e.g., "Lips that touch tobacco shall never touch mine." They will not under most circumstances be intentionally reconsidered; in this they differ from transient

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plans of action. A principle may have a practical (non-interpersonal) goal-- for instance, an alcoholic may have learned that he is safe if he stays off entirely-- or it may have as its <u>intent</u> the giving of <u>impressions</u>-- e.g., "I always put up my women in style." Either of these, we may assume, is an "operating rule," since it would be reconsidered if it didn't work out. (N.B.: "Zweckrationalität.")

Principles may also be held for philosophical reasons. When we say, some people live more "by principles" than others, I think we are usually referring to conspicuous principles/ -- operating rules that keep colliding with things-- or those of a high generality. The "man of principle" will have, presumably, an more explicit set of principles (from which he does not plan to deviate) ready at hand than the more spineless of us. Between "I never lend out my tape recorder" and "I always give to charity" I can see no clear distinction relevant here, save the instrumentality of one and the apparent etherseality of the other. But I think the distinctions between "operating rule" and "general principle" is clear enough to us on the grub-level. Neither is likely to be reconsidered on the spot, or swayed by apparent differences between cases; but we expect that if the guy makes an exception, it will be the operating rule that gives first.

With many of his principles, a man considers his impression of <u>himself:</u> that holding them will make him feel like a more satisfactory person.

Let us know that the choosing of operating rules can be one of the most rational, considered procedures-- as in operations research. However, there is a kind of operating rule

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which is quite troublesome to evaluate in this context. I speak of those operating rules based on vague impressions.

For one thing, such rules can be rational. When somebody is conducting you through a machine shop, and shows especial leeriness of some particular machine, your impression of his knowledge may quite reasonably lead you to do the same. Can we say that conforming behavior in Asch-type experiments is wholly irrationaly?

To be sure, there is no justification for hating somebody just because others hate him; but at the other end it is absurd to say that one should never ape others. Perhaps we can say that a rule like "agree when data is lacking, but search andmm use data if possible" is the best operating rule for avoiding foolish agreement. But we are sophisticated about the differences in evidence for kinds of problems, and know there ism no simply satisfactory operating-rule on this level.

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2.0 I would like to turn now to the notion of "free will," which I think is neither metaphysical nor useless; which, in fact, has some bearing on social behavior, that in which responsibility is assigned.

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2.1 Intentionality alone does not show that an act was performed with "free will," for there are many degrees of intentionality. A careless, absent-minded act may be intentional, but the predicate "free will" is usually reserved for certain circumstances.

2.2 Let me now explain the way I believe "free will" is used, both in meta-jurisprudence and (if implicitly) in much everyday life. I would like to show that it is a necessary part of all contractual action (where obligations are explicit) and an entailment of the accusation of criminality.

Suppose an eight-year-old boy signs a contract promising to buy sixty-four automobiles, paying one cent for the first, two cents for the second, four for the third, and so on. This is not a mistake an adult would ordinarily make; the boy has failed properly to consider the consequences of his act (through arithmetic inability;) what would be obvious considerations for the adult (summing precisely the amount to be paid) are not so for him. It would seem an offhand conclusion that, having been billed because of his tender years, he should not be held responsible for fulfilling the contract. (In fact, such is the law.)

However, it seems reasonable that a used-car dealer should be allowed to contract to buy cars, or he would not get anywhere.

Then there is the in-between case: a flopsy person signs a contract that seems very unfavorable to him, and the other party rubs his hands in avaricious glee. There has got to be

5.1 Intentionality alone does not show that an act was performed with "free will," for there are many degrees of intentionality. A careless, absent-minded act may be intentional, but the predicate "free will" is usually reserved for certain circumstances.

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Suppose an eight-year-old boy signs a contract promising to buy sixty-four automobiles, paying one cent for the first, two cents for the second, four for the third, and so on. This is not a mistake an adult would ordinarily make; the boy has failed properly to consider the consequences of his act (through arithmetic inability;) what would be obvious considerations for the adult (summing precisely the amount to be paid) are not so for him. It would seem an offhand conclusion that, having been billed because of his tender years, he should not be held responsible for fulfilling the contract. (In fact, such is the law.)

However, it seems reasonable that a used-car dealer should be allowed to contract to buy cars, or he would not get anywhere.

Then there is the in-between case: a flopsy person signs a contract that seems very unfavorable to him, and the other party robs his pockets with various glee. There has not to be

some way of dealing with these in-between cases; the contracts cannot be half-valid. There must be a way of deciding whether all parties to an agreeement are taking the consequences reasonably into consideration.

There is no way of doing this on the basis of their decisions. Suppose George is taking a walk, and Harry says, "Look, take your galoshes." George replies, "Oh, it won't rain." Both Harry and George can see how the weather looks, and they are predicting differently. Whether George should take his galoshes depends on the reasonableness of his prediction; his utility function (how much he prefers galoshlessness to wet feet;) and the contour of his strategy (minmax, maxmin, etc.) We are not good enough telepaths to do this. While a friend may say to someone, "Look here, are you sure you know what you're doing?", there must for legal contexts be circumstances under which a choice of action is presumptively made with full consideration of relevant factors-- i.e., we can judge the validity of a contract by looking at the situation, not the people or wording. When such circumstances pertain, we deem it proper to say, "Well, you should have considered these factors, so your loss is your own fault."

This-- intention and extent of consideration diagnosed by circumstance-- is the analysis of "free will" which I take to be correct for most contexts. The circumstances are bounded by law in legalistic situations. You have free will to sign a contract when you are twenty-one and not under the influence of narcotics, etc. The theological "free will," while varying with denomination, is often thought to be an attrib-

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ute of an act which it is presumed you would certainly not do except when considering the right reasons (like communion, adult baptism.) Sometimes it is thought to be an attribute which Man "always" possesses-- here we could still call it circumstancial (albeit forcedly,) where the circumstances of being human and sincere are enough to validate a prayer, sacrament or the like.

The legalistic sense I have expounded here may easily be extended to cover such examples as "You have to take the final. You registered for this course of your own free will," "The crime was a willful one: the defendant is not insane."*

2.3 The sensation of <u>effort</u> is often brought up in connection with free will. "You have to make an effort" is a frequently-encountered kind of statement. "It will be hard, but you have to give up smoking," a doctor tells a patient; "You must exercise will power." To translate freely: "Despite the unpleasantness and pain, it should be clear that other con-

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* While the controversy over legal sanity and the M'Naughton rule is of humanitarian interest, I regard it as (unless we are to change the whole legal framework) a question of mere boundary-setting. Clearly there could be established legal <u>degrees</u> of insanity-- several categories-- or we could draw the insanity-line as to include far more, or far less cases-- or we could blur further the existing line, say, by establishing a man as legally insane when he is testified to be so by three psychiatrists-- or two psychiatrists, a homeopath and a pediatrician. But these possibilities do not affect my thesis.

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siderations are to be regarded as more important."

Radical behaviorists and others who reject the notion of "will power" ass metaphysical or otherwise pernicious may perhaps be sold the idea if on analysis we pretend we are only talking about the symptoms of effort, anxiety, vacillation, uncertainty, relinquishment. While I prefer the phenomenological view, that this is what we feel, if they will crown the body the thoughts can stay private.

2.4 Thus, if we tell a child whom we know is tempted to steal to "exert will power," we mean he must regard certain considerations as more important than others, and he is to ignore certain discomforts to achieve something more important.

(I do not mean to suggest that we should talk to a child in this vein. But this is what we might sensibly mean, if we did so.)

Let it be noted that if a person cannot be made to agree that some considerations furnish a more binding imperative than others, there is no point in asking him to exert will power. Perhaps this is the mistake of penologists who speak of the criminal's "weak moral fiber."

3.0 Getting people to do things we want is a problem most of us are familiar with. Its complexity in a given situation depends on how intricate are those things the parties must consider. In the busiest cases, the getter and got consider carefully their impressions of each others' intention, invoking theories of the others' personality; make complex predictions

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about each others' likely actions; and carefully consider what impressions they will make with their own actions. If this isn not psychic feedback, what could be? All of life is not, but some of life is, a game of chess.

3.1 There are many things we may want people to do. Be nice to us, give us money, love us, lend us a car. And so we try to give impressions which the other parties will consider in such a way as to get what we want.

We may seek to give a true impressionx, or a false impression, or give an impression that emphasizes some things and denigrates others (as on a college application.) Straight predictive impressions are usually either true or false. However, because of the summary problem (dealt with under 1.2,) there is a vast in-between ground.

Many of our actions are produced by a combination of factors: our attempted intentional impressions, our operating rules, our principles. Bringing flowers to an invalid, for instance, can be the result of any of these, or all. (A businessman might send flowers to his ill customers strictly as an operating rule.)

3.2 At last we come to the problems of threats, retribution, revenge and belligerence.

Frequently people have the power to do harm to other people, or create pain or discomfort or disadvantage.

When someone gives the impression intentionally that he is about to do so, it is a threat. A spoken threat is more ex-

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plicit than mere menacing gestures.

Explicit intentional impressions, it will be remembered, cannot be properly considered unless it is known how likely they are to be true; when they carry predictive content, like a threat, other considerations (weapons, size of opponent, exits) are quite relevant.

Some threats may be met with counterthreat. If you can give another person the impression that you will harm him badly if he harms you, he is in general less likely to do so.

He, in turn, must consider your power to carry through your counterthreat; and your likelihood of doing so.

If it seems reasonable to believe that you will do so, we can say that there exists a scheduled retribution.

If our opponent knows us very well, it is very difficult (or unsafe) to fake the likelihood of retribution where none exists. Hence the smarter he is, the more our counterthreat has to be true. Therefore, we may try to consign retribution to bloodless and automatic mechanisms-- rationally, on our part, for this will clinch his impression of sure penalty. We may then hope no one miscalculates.

Now, let us examine the way people act toward potential situations of this kind. There are all kinds of operating rules that will get you through life, and their relative merits depend, in part, on your abilities and the situations you find yourself in.

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And now let me say that there are situations-- particularly in international politics-- when a clear and explicit schedule of retribution may deter acts harmful to you. Again, rational.

(It has been a long way around Robin Hood's barn, but I wanted to state a clear objection to the extreme social-psychological view as it is sometimes applied to international politics: that acts of belligerence betray raw, blowsy affect; that there is never rationality in acts of war, or threats. But it should be clear from the above that even if there never had been rationality in warlike acts, there could be.)

(The cousin of this view, pacifism, also deserves an aside. While a pacifist cannot plausibly argue that such situations -- those in which belligerence or scheduled retribution are rationally justifiable-- are impossible, he can certainly argue 1) that they are difficult to diagnose, 2) that our readiness to diagnose a situation as calling for a schedule of retribution may be incorrect but make itself true, 3) that readiness to schedule retribution may aggravate what has only been mild belligerence, 4) that it is an undesirable and dangerous operating rule to be in any way aggressive or touchy.)

Finally, revenge. It seems to me-- and this is on the fringe

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Finally, revenge. It seems to me -- and this is on the extreme

of my general analysis-- that "revenge" refers to loosely scheduled retribution, possibly on principle. (Clearly the word suggests affect, too, but I am trying to leave that out.) I would like to say that even revenge, where there has been no antecedent explicit counterthreat, may on occasion be a rational act. (I omit the sense of gratification, pride, etc., that we may get from the successful vendetta.) If a man, for some grievances, thinks to murder my brother, and he is under the good clear impression that my uncles and cousins and I will get him for it, there is less likelihood of the act, pure and simple. It may be a quaint Sicilian folkway, but it is also practical, unless we can break the system.

3.3 Losing one's temper is often thought, both by eminent theoreticians and everyday persons, to represent purely an eruption of affect when a boiling-point is reached. This is sometimes true. But let it be recalled that losing one's temper may be also in part an intentional act.

Insofar as it is performed under consideration, the following two conditions pertain:

1) the results may have been considered,

2) operating rules may have been considered.

Examples: 1) some people lose their temper when their impression is that another person will go too far if they don't. 2) Some people lose their tempers when they hear the word "kike"-- under the consideration, perhaps, that the people around them will not again knowingly use the word in their

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presence.

It should be clear that these ways of doing things may have gratifying results at times.

3.4 Compliments are interesting. A compliment may explicitly describe a mental state ("I admire you;") it may suggest (through assimilation with the hearer's other relevant impressions) future behavior ("Well, if she likes me so much, maybe she'll be fun if I take her out.")

3.5 The stage is now set for a discussion of insult and apology.

An insult is several things, to extents which vary with the case. To really push wind, let me describe it as an intentional milmd offense which the recipient believes to be intentional.

I rely here on anecdotal evidence which the reader may supply for himself. First, the insult does only minor harm or unpleasantness, otherwise we would call it more than an insult-- a combined insult and harm. Second, its intentionality makes it more than a neutral action: if somebody is standing on our foot accidentally, we can ask him to step off; but if he is doing so deliberately, asking him to step off may not do any good. It would be asking him for a favor (perhaps just what he wants us to do,) and he might not perform it. Being refused such a favor can be demeaning-lowering self-esteem, respect from others, and perhaps leading him to further insult which we would look foolish to

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bridle at suddenly.

For these reasons, it is often essential for us to assess the intentionality of an action. (It is often difficult.) It is for considerations like these that most of us often avoid borderline acts, those which "might give offense;" if is for this reason that people obviously more bland and less crafty are assumed to be well-intentioned, meaning no offense.

Some of us have personalities or habits in whose context we may graciously ignore insult; others, particularly those whom everybody expects to take offense, would seem more awkward doing so, and lead others to expect their future cowardice. Hence, as before, there can be a rationality in touchiness-- even ignoring gratifications we may get for our self-image, a readiness to take offense may sometimes be a rewarding thing-- if not for its deterrent value, for the rewards that may result from others' ~~attitudes toward us~~ impressions of us.

Now, some insults change the relationship between people and some do not. If the person insulted believes that it was for transient causes-- i.e., it will not be repeated in the future, or will be repeated only under stress or the like-- then he may well dismiss it. Or it may be that his consideration-span is narrow-- a merry, sanguine person may be inclined to shed these things because he is kindly selective among the things he considers, and people know him to be so selective. Hence their impressions of him will not change when he ignores the insult.

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insult, we may say that a "state of offense" exists. There are two ways that this may proceed, depending on whether in this particular social milieu offenses are scheduled or not. If they are scheduled in a formal way, the participants may engage in a duel or potlatch or something.

If there is no ordinary insult-scheduling, things will proceed according to the impressions, calculations and operating-rules of the participants. If both are belligerent, under the operating-rule that what might be an insult should be treated as one, hostilities will probably be enlarged. If either predicts that he can humiliate the other, by enlarging the conflict, he will probably try to; if either predicts that ending the conflict will be to his advantage, he will probably try to do <u>that</u>; with the proviso that he shall not give the impression of backing down, unless he has the impression that this will be to his advantage.

In certain circumstances, which I shall not try to describe, the offender (probably) will <u>apologize</u>. Let me try to describe the function of the apology.

The apology is, first, a formal termination of the state of offense. Once made, it provides a clear circumstancial excuse for both parties to resume their normal relationship, or become even better friends, should they desire. Without the apology, even should they become friendly again, both may have the impression that hostilities have never really ended.

Second, the apology suggests (or may say explicitly) that the offender sees things differently now-- that the things he will take into consideration in the future will be

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different from those of the past. Note that this impression -- only possibly intentional, only possibly given-- is different from the predictive aspect of the apology, since it refers to a mental state. However, they are pretty closely linked.

3.6 Let me give an extended example.

Boy scouts are gathering for a hike. They were supposed to meet at 7:30; it is now 7:40, and they are clearly not all there. However, they have roughly been formed into ranks by their scoutmaster. Let us take the following conversation:

1. Johnny. Mr. Bupkis, may I get out of line to telephone my mother?

2. Scoutmaster. You don't need to call your mother.

3. Johnny. Yes I do. I forgot to tell her something.
4. Scoutmaster. You can tell her when you get home.
5. Johnny. Darnx it, why can't you let me out of line! We won't be ready to go for ten minutes!

6. Scoutmaster. There's a rule about breaking ranks.

7. Johnny. (Whimpering notes in voice.) Doggone it, you're always picking on me!

8. Scoutmaster. All right, Johnny, you can call your mother.

Let me now list some of the considerations which, within the framework of the present theory, may be influencing behavior. I will assume that no affect whatsoever is actually involved.

Line 2, if Bupkis is able to make it stick, suggests that Johnny is unable properly to gauge his own needs. It

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Line 2, if Bupkis is able to make it stick, suggests that Johnny is unable properly to gauge his own needs. It

gives the impression that Bupkis is right-- hence that ~~Bupkis~~ Johnny is overly dependent on his mother. Therefore, if this is an impression which Johnny definitely does not want to give, he must continue to assert his need. If he tells Bupkis just what it is he needs to tell his mother, however, Bupkis will be able to openly deny the need. Line 5 is useful for this reason-- it shifts the kind of argument by a mild loss of temper. Moreover, the loss of temper gives the impression that this is a real need, one which is important enough to lose one's temper about. The whimpering notes in line 7 reinforce this impression. However, it may be presumed that these will also give the impression he is a mama's boy. Hence, if Johnny is keeping track of all factors in the conversation, his decision to press the point suggests that he would rather give the impression of consistency, even to the point of sissiness, than back down in order not to seem very childish. In this way he may give the impression that his needs are real, and to be reckoned with by people who oppose him, since he does not back down. Whether he has actually made this decision is a matter of how fast he thinks on his feet, and how many factors he can consider at once. (Finding out that he has made this decision is another problem.)

Bupkis, in line 8, may be seeking to avoid giving the impression that he does pick on Johnny; he may be seeking to avoid giving the impression that he is generally cruel; he may just want to avoid disruption on the hike.

If all this seems obvious, let me mention that similar situations are described with a very different interpretation

Gives the impression that Bupkis is right-- hence that Jeppis is overly dependent on his mother. Therefore, if this is an impression which Johnny definitely does not want to give, he must continue to assert his need. If he tells Bupkis just what it is he needs to tell his mother, however, Bupkis will be able to openly deny the need. Line 5 is useful for this reason-- it shifts the kind of argument by a mild loss of temper. Moreover, the loss of temper gives the impression that this is a real need, one which is important enough to lose one's temper about. The whimpering notes in line 7 reinforce this impression. However, it may be presumed that these will also give the impression he is a mama's boy. Hence, if Johnny is keeping track of all factors in the conversation, his decision to press the point as Gerta that he would rather give the impression of consistency, even to the point of alienness, then back down in order not to seem very childish. In this way he may give the impression that his needs are real, and to be reckoned with by people who oppose him, since he does not back down. Whether he has actually made this decision is a matter of how fast he thinks on his feet, and how many factors he can consider at once. (Finding out that he has made this decision is another problem.)

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4.0 Mental states as reward or punishment. In the foregoing, I have spoken of the diagnosis of mental states and the prediction of behavior. However, there is more. The mental state of either person can itself become an end, with almost no reference to behavior: witness the attempt to make a dying man comfortable, or hurt the feelings of an impassive bureaucrat who refuses our request. (Both of these behaviors, however, would seem to have the emotional causes I have kept not-talking about.)

However, we need not depart from the present analysis. Presumably your behavior toward other people will be better rewarded if you "treat them as ends, not means"-- in other words, seem to be interested in their comfort and happiness rather than in what they will do for you. But it is very difficult to give the impression of general interest in someone's welfare unless you actually have it. Hence behavior which best gives the impression of being oriented toward others' welfare-- that which is-- will often be rewarded-in-the-long-run. Hence we may learn to be interested in others' welfare and apparent comfort. (Intentional inflicting of pain can be added similarly.)

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this one much. If the behaviorist will accept an behavioral description of "happy" in terms of recent reward, laughter, etc., and admit that such states are sometimes recognizable by laymen, the horse has bolted; others' mental states even on his account may be correctly acted on by others.

5.0 I have not taken much epistemological care: partly because I am in a hurry, partly because I am not entirely clear on how to set this up more rigorously. But I will be quite surprised if I am wrong, i.e., if people never behave the way I claim they sometimes do in regard to each others' calculations, and if such actions are never rational-- even in the baby-sense where "rational" means correctly-considered and gratifying.

There is a great deal in sociology which has no need of such models: lots of correlation-finding and macroscopic study can proceed usefully without it. But as a statement of what really happens between people, I can't understand how to manage without it.

I am interested to know how my account fits in with other people's. I would be interested to know, for example, whether Festinger's account of verbal behavior under stress is a parallel account, or contradicts the one I might want to make.

The most interesting objection to all this that I can think of might be stated as follows: "What you say is perfectly obvious on an intuitive level, and apparently true in some sort of summary fashion, but it doesn not have

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researchable consequences, and is perhaps unnecessary for a social science proper. If we need to get "inside the head" for psychological explanations, they may proceed without such intricate theories; indeed, without the idea of conscious experience."

My answer to this should be clear by now. If the conniving calculations I have described ever do take place, they are of necessity within the purview of the social scientist; if he will agree that they do take place, and Joe can sometimes guess correctly what Jack is considering, perhaps we can foist on him the word "conscious" as a contrastive term -- opposing, say, decisions made in sleep. When you and I use the term, we will know, of course, that that's not <u>all</u> we mean; but we can be polite, and not tell the behaviorist he is eating atm our table. If this much is permitted in social psychology, I am not sure what it would <u>mean</u> to be a behaviorist, except that in trying to explain he might look <u>first</u> for the simple ding-dong response (as to bell, swastika, Negro) and if these explanations seem insipid turn to the more complex ones involving evaluation, prediction, calculation of impressions and psychic feedback.

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